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Abstract 
 
What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What 
implications does this have for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? 
The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity – 
between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement 
– to promote a swap with a supermajority of creditors. Our analysis of Argentine debt 
litigation reveals a ‘judge-mediated’ sovereign debt restructuring, which resolves the 
key issues of Transition and Aggregation - two of the tasks envisaged for the IMF’s 
still-born Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. 
 
For the future, we discuss how judge-mediated sovereign debt restructuring (together 
with creditor committees) could complement the alternative promoted by the US 
Treasury, namely collective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts. 
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Introduction 
 
The progressive switch from bank loans to sovereign bonds in lending to emerging 
markets – and the Brady Plan in particular – triggered a lively debate on bond 
restructuring and the potential obstacles posed by ‘holdout creditors’1. But the IMF 
proposal for a new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (Krueger, 2003) to tackle 
the issue found little favour with creditors or debtors and this left the US Treasury-
backed initiative for putting Collective Action Clauses (CACs) into sovereign bond 
contracts as the preferred alternative.  
 
When in 2005 Argentina successfully restructured the majority of its defaulted foreign 
debt, this was neither mediated by the IMF, nor assisted by clauses to promote creditor 
coordination. It was effected by a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the debtor, accepted by a 
supermajority of bondholders despite the substantial ‘haircut’ involved.2 It is our 
contention that the US courts played a major role in promoting the swap; and will 
probably continue to do so in future debt restructurings. In this paper we give an 
account of how the process of “judge-mediated” debt restructuring has operated in this 
case; and we speculate on future developments.  
 
To some observers, the size of the write-down involved in the Argentine case suggests 
that “rogue debtors, rather than rogue creditors, are the ones that pose the greatest threat 
to the integrity and efficiency of the international financial architecture,” Porzecanski 
(2005, p.331). Despite the waiving of sovereign immunity, it is argued, “the fact 
remains that it is exceedingly difficult to collect from a sovereign deadbeat [and] the sad 
truth is that only other governments…can hope to rein in a wayward sovereign debtor 
and persuade it not to walk away from its lawful obligations.”  
 
Others take a more optimistic view: for Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005c, p.10) the 
Argentine swap was “in most dimensions a textbook example of how to do an 
exchange”. In reviewing recent litigation in international debt markets, however, they 
                                                 
1 These include vulture funds who buy distressed debt in default and sue for payment in full, Fisch and 
Gentile (2004). 
2 Creditors who enter the swap suffered a loss of about two thirds in the face value of their bonds; those 
who did not have, so far, received nothing from Argentina in more than a year after the swap. 
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found no evidence that sanctions on trade and payments have been imposed in an 
effective way. Recent developments, they argue, provide support for the assumption 
made in the seminal paper by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981): that while “creditors cannot 
impose any sanction on defaulting countries, they can hinder its access to international 
capital markets”, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b, pp.7, 51).  
 
Careful examination of the Argentine debt swap of 2005 leads us to challenge both 
views. While Porzecanski concludes that the courts are irrelevant, we note that the 
judge appears to have exploited creditor heterogeneity – between holdouts seeking 
capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement, in particular  – first to 
achieve a swap and then to protect creditor rights. Likewise, the simple dichotomy 
between sanctions and reputation proposed by  Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (as the 
only mechanisms to ensure a successful swap) misses a key factor: namely judicial 
intervention. 
 
Our analysis of the opinions and orders of Judge Griesa’s court suggests four distinct 
phases of judge-mediated debt restructuring. First comes the engagement of the debtor: 
the Judge finds in favour of holdouts in order to encourage the debtor to make an offer. 
Second is promoting the swap: he refuses enforcement long enough to promote a 
successful debt swap. Third threatening attachment: once the swap has been accepted 
by a supermajority, it is time for the courts to threaten the debtor with enforcement 
(effectively denying it access to primary capital markets). Finally, direct mediation: at 
the same time as the judge threatens attachment, he is willing to resolve disagreements 
between some holdouts, e.g. retail investors, and the debtor to settle outstanding claims. 
Currently, the last two phases prevail simultaneously.  
 
In their discussion of sovereign debt restructuring, Fisch and Gentile (2004) emphasise 
the role of holdout litigation in the enforcement of sovereign obligations. We too see 
creditor litigation continuing to be important: but only in the period of transition to 
CACs do we consider that vultures play a pivotal role. In a future where CACs are 
widespread, it may well be litigation by an ex ante Creditor Committees that triggers the 
debtor to come up with an offer. 
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The paper is organised as follows: section 1 briefly reviews the literature on why  
sovereigns pay and indicates where our analysis fits in. In the next section we outline 
the salient features of the Argentine case (with discussion of a bargaining interpretation 
of the swap in an Appendix) and discuss a bargaining interpretation of the swap, section 
2. The next two sections, 3 and 4, analyse the opinions and decisions of the New York 
courts: encouraging the debtor to make the first offer (in Dubai, September 2003); 
promoting the ensuing debt restructuring process (from Dubai to the final offer in 
March 2005); and acting to help resolve the holdout problem. Section 5 indicates how 
the widespread adoption of CACs will reduce the role of vultures in future and sketches 
the role that courts and creditor committees will play. The last section concludes. 
 
1. Why do sovereigns pay? 
 
How does the analysis in this paper relate to the existing literature on the incentives for 
sovereigns to repay debt? What role have these incentives played in the Argentine case? 
The academic literature has stressed the role of ‘direct’ sanctions, ‘policy conditionality’ 
and ‘reputational’ sanctions imposed by creditors, as indicated in Table 3, lines 1 to 3a. 
But such mechanisms played a minor role in the Argentine case: they were “the dogs 
that did not bark”, to make an analogy with Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Hound of the 
Baskervilles. Before outlining the role of the courts in helping to achieve the swap (see 
line 3(b) of the table), we discuss in more detail the failure of the other mechanisms. 
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Table 1. Why do sovereigns honour their debts? 
 
  
  
Loss of Comment Agent/ 
Institution 
Mechanism The case of 
Argentina 
Exports Transfer ‘Gunboat’(1)  Illegal under 
WTO 
Output Transfer ‘Gunboat’(2)  Illegal under 
international law
 Deadweight Crisis(3), Creditor panic Yes ( including 
anticipatory 
crisis (4)) 
Trade credit  Banks(5) Deny rollovers 
to business 
Yes, short term 
1. Sanctions 
  
  
  
  
Collateral 
Assets 
Transfer Court as 
enforcer(6) 
Attachment Unsuccessful 
Sovereignty 
over policy 
Explicit IMF as 
enforcer(7) 
Program 
conditions 
Yes, but IMF 
repaid in Dec 
2005 
  
2. Policy 
Conditionality 
  International 
Goodwill 
Implicit G7(8)   
Reputation 
with leading 
banks 
 “Anarchy”(9) “Cheat the 
cheater” 
Not evident  
from sovereign 
spreads 
3. Market access 
 
(a) denied by  
banks 
 
(b) denied by  
      courts 
Access to 
primary 
capital 
markets 
By 
sovereign 
Court as 
gatekeeper(10)
 
 
Court as 
mediator (10)
Threat of 
attachment 
pending 
 
Willingness to 
resolve 
disagreements 
between 
holdouts and 
debtor 
 
Notes to Table  
1. Esteves (2005) 
2.  Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 
3. Dooley (2000), Gai et al. (2004), Irwin et al. (2006), Jeanne and Ranciere (2005) 
4. Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2005) 
5. Kohlscheen and O’Connell (2003) 
6. E.M.LTD v. The Republic of Argentina (12 Sept 2003) 
7. Sgard (2004) 
8. Kaletsky (1985) 
9. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kletzer and Wright (2002) 
10. Fisch and Gentile (2004), Miller and Thomas (this paper) 
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Sanctions 
The use of direct military threats to enforce debt contracts may have been relevant in the 
nineteenth century when ‘gunboat diplomacy’ was common, but not now: WTO rules 
prohibit trade intervention for purposes of debt collection, and seizures not authorised 
by a court are, by definition, illegal. But as capital markets have become increasingly 
globalised, the waiving of sovereign immunity – often required as a precondition for 
issuing debt in London or New York – has allowed for the attachment of collateral 
assets under court procedures: specialist vulture funds have developed litigation 
strategies to exploit these possibilities. In the case of Argentina, however, efforts by 
holdout creditors to attach assets have been a failure, as indicated in the last column of 
Table 1.  
Another feature of modern capital markets is the ease with which creditors can exit; so 
sovereign debtors are exposed to creditor panic with associated financial and exchange 
rate crises, Ghosal and Miller (2002). Reducing or avoiding the output losses that can be 
triggered by capital flight is now regarded as a strong incentive for sovereigns to honour 
their debts, as the references in note (2) to the Table make clear.3 In the Argentine case, 
severe output losses have of course occurred but – since default was widely anticipated 
– they ensued well before default: and, while the debt was being restructured, recovery 
got well under way. (A sanction that could have played a role in this case is the denial 
of trade credit, a device commonly used to put pressure on defaulting sovereigns, 
Kohlscheen and O’Connell, 2003).  
Policy conditionality 
Since the IMF policy of ‘lending into arrears’ initiated during the Latin American debt 
crises of the 1980s, the Fund has had to insist on explicit policy conditionality to avoid  
undermining debtors incentives to repay. Signing the Letter of Intent that embodies such 
conditions is a precondition for obtaining IMF programme assistance. In the cases of 
Korea in 1997 and Brazil in 2002, indeed, prospective presidents were persuaded to 
endorse targets for fiscal prudence before elections took place, an illustration of the loss 
                                                 
3 As with bank-runs there is a risk of self-fulfilling crisis occurring: schemes to reduce this risk include 
Cohen and Portes (2004) and Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2005). 
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of sovereignty mentioned in the Table. Conditions for rolling over IMF lending to 
Argentina after default did include the requirement that steps be taken to settle with 
holdout creditors: but, for the IMF, Argentina was effectively “too big to fail”; and in 
any case it freed itself from any such policy conditionality by early repayment of all its 
borrowing in 2006. Kaletsky (1985) stresses the role of international pressure from G7, 
but this does not seem to have played an important part in the Argentine case. 
Market access 
An alternative incentive to repay debts would be fear of losing reputation, with 
consequent widening of the bonds spread from normal junk bond levels4 to what might 
be described as rogue-debt levels. Despite Porzecanski’s characterisation, this does not 
appear to be the case for Argentina – where spreads are close to those of Brazil. Kletzer 
and Wright (2000) analyse a self-enforcing mechanism – ‘cheat the cheater’ – that could 
sustain equilibrium in debt markets with a limited number of creditors, see Table 1, line 
3a.5 Their analysis, however, is explicitly related to bank lending as in the original 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) paper: how, if at all, it might be extended to a world of 
anonymous bondholders is unclear. 
The argument of this paper is that the courts have played a key role in the Argentine 
case: initially by threatening the debtor with attachments to prompt a credible offer, and 
reining in the holdouts to promote the swap. After the successful swap, the threat of 
attachment has effectively denied the debtor access to primary capital markets, namely 
London and New York. As indicated in line 3(b) of Table 1, denial of access to these 
markets is one way of pressuring a defaulting debtor to settle pending claims against it. 
By undertaking to resolve disagreements between the debtor and holdouts, the court 
also provides a mechanism to ensure successful settlements.  
We conclude that whatever pressure there is on Argentina to finalise the swap it is not 
coming from self-enforcing reputation mechanisms which operate in an institutional 
vacuum as suggested by Kletzer and Wright. Court denial of access to New York for the 
issue of new bonds may not impose immediate hardship on the country or its finances: 
                                                 
4 As it is prone to restructuring, corporate debt in the US is often referred to as junk bonds. 
5 It should be noted, however, that not only Venezuela but also New York banks are happily lending into 
serious arrears by Argentina : is this consistent with the Kletzer/ Wright equilibrium? 
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but it is surely not credible that a middle-income country like Argentina will wish 
forever to be excluded from the leading capital markets of the world.  
 
 
2. Key aspects of the Argentine debt restructuring  
 
The Argentine case is notable for being the largest-ever sovereign debt default and for 
being conducted without decisive intervention by international institutions. Before 
providing our account of role of the US courts in this case, four salient features of the 
Argentine swap may be discussed with the aid of Table 2: namely, the heterogeneity of 
creditors groups, the absence of creditor coordination, the size of the write down, and 
the long delay before it was accepted. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Recent Sovereign Debt Restructurings 
(Porzecanski, 2005) 
 
 
 
ARGENTINA 
2005 
ECUADOR 
2000 
PAKISTAN 
1999 
RUSSIA 
1998-2000 
UKRAINE 
1998-2000 
URUGUAY 
2003 
Per Capita Income ($)* 11,586 3,363 1,826 6,592 3,841 8,280 
Scope ($ Billions) 81.8 6.8 0.6 31.8 3.3 5.4 
Number of Bonds 152 5 3 3 5 65 
Jurisdictions Involved  8 2 1 1 3 6 
Months in Default 38+ 10 2 18 3 9 
Principal Forgiveness Yes Yes No Yes No No 
‘Haircut’ in Discount 
Bond (%) 66.3 40 0 37.5 0 0 
Participation Rate (%  
of Eligible) 76 97 95 98 95 93 
Note: N/A stands for not applicable 
* Adjusted for purchasing power, latest (2003) data for Argentina, otherwise data corresponds to year(s) of 
debt restructuring as noted. 
Source: IIF IMF, World Bank, A. C. Porzecanski’s calculations.
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(i) Pronounced creditor heterogeneity 
 
Argentine debt in default contained a significantly higher number of bond issues than all 
the other cases listed in the table: it involved many thousands of creditors in eight 
different legal jurisdictions. The sheer numbers posed a major obstacle to effecting a 
swap. Perhaps more significant, however, were the conflicting incentives affecting 
different groups.  
 
As Fisch and Gentile (2004, p.26) note ‘[o]nly certain large institutional investors, 
particularly commercial banks and investment banks have ongoing relationships with 
the sovereign debtors… [this] may drive these institutional investors to support 
restructuring plans that are unlikely to be acceptable to smaller investors, notably retail 
investors, who do not expect to gain from future transactions…’ In addition, there are a 
specialised class of holdout litigants popularly known as ‘vulture funds’ who purchase 
distressed debt at substantial discounts and seek capital gains either through the 
restructuring process or by holding out and seeking additional payments from the 
debtors. (The 24% creditors still holding defaulted Argentine bonds include both 
vultures and retail investors.) 
 
(ii)Absence of creditor co-ordination  
 
Due in part to the aggressive negotiating stance taken by the sovereign, Argentina’s 
creditors participated in the swap in the absence of either formal or informal creditor 
organisations. One exception was the short-lived Global Committee of Argentine 
Bondholders (GCAB). The GCAB was set up in 2003 to pool negotiating leverage and 
demand a better deal claiming to represent US, European and Japanese creditors holding 
about $40 million. But at the time of the swap, the GCAB had lost most of its 
institutional constituents and a majority tendered in the exchange. This attempt at 
creditor organisation failed as each seemed to act in their own self-interest and took the 
opportunity to cut their losses and make short-term gains, Gelpern (2005).   
 
 10
(iii) Significant debt write-down 
 
On a total outstanding principal of $81.8 billion, the Argentine swap involved a 66.3% 
‘haircut’ (column 1). This is considerably larger than the other haircuts shown, namely 
40% for Ecuador and 37.5% for Russia: whether it is consistent with bargaining theory 
we consider in the Appendix. The 76% participation rate in the swap is by far the lowest 
shown and implies that Argentina is still in default with 24% of its creditors by value.  
 
(iv) Long Delay 
 
It took over three years for Argentina to restructure its debt – more than twice as long as 
it took Russia for example. In part, the reasons were political, as the interim 
administration of President Duhalde had no mandate to negotiate a swap. Economic 
reasons for delay are also analysed in the Appendix. 
 
 
3. Judge-mediated debt restructuring: from default to swap  
 
Historical precedents 
 
In 1976, the US (and, soon after, the UK) imposed statutory constraints on absolute 
sovereign immunity from suit in foreign courts, Buchheit (1995). In the two decades 
that followed, creditors developed innovative litigation strategies to maximise the 
benefits of restricted sovereign immunity. In the absence of statutory regulation of 
sovereign debt, however, the litigation strategies have had mixed results - with common 
law decisions influenced by the political and economic conditions in which the 
litigations were pursued.  
 
Even in the absence of enforcement, restricted sovereign immunity has significantly 
improved the leverage of creditors in the restructuring process. In the case Elliot & 
Associates v. Banco de La Nación (Perú) decided in 1999, for example, the claimants 
were vulture funds who threatened the debtor with enforcement and consequent delay of 
the imminent swap: the debtor settled their claims out of court to avoid this outcome. 
Similarly, in the case Elliot & Associates v. Panamá decided in 1997, the threat of 
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enforcement would have interfered with a new bond issue and consequently impaired 
Panama’s ability to access capital markets. Again, the case was settled out of court, in 
favour of the vultures.  
 
Moreover, in the case Pravin Banker v. Banco Popular del Perú decided in 1997, the 
court went as far as to lay down the guidelines that they would follow in sovereign 
litigation. The first guideline was to encourage orderly debt restructuring initiatives that 
involved the use of Brady bonds. The second guideline was to ensure the enforcement 
of contracts executed between American investors and sovereign debtors. In line with 
U.S. foreign policy at the time, in most cases the second guideline dominates the first: 
thus in a situation where ongoing debt- restructuring negotiations were at the cost of the 
claims of U.S. creditors, the courts were bound to concede to the latter.   
 
The court’s role in the Argentine swap 
 
The Argentine swap was successfully concluded against the backdrop of over 200 law 
suits – (including 15 class action suits) filed in New York, Italy and Germany. How was 
this achieved? We believe that in large part it was due to mediation by the judge; and in 
Table 3 we summarise the actions taken by Judge Griesa to promote restructuring.   
 
Table 3. Judge Griesa’s Actions to Promote Restructurings 
 
Event In favour of holdout 
creditors  
In favour of restructuring 
Rush to court house Summary judgements  in favour of creditors Stays execution 
Class action to 
coordinate creditors Accepts in principle   
• encourages tighter 
definition of a ‘class’ 
• keeps pari passu pending 
Grab race: 
 for old bonds 
Orders creditor attachment 
(of Argentina’s right to 
receive old bonds) 
Order to attach overturned in 
view of its negative impact on 
the ongoing swap 
Grab race: 
 for new issues  
Maintains the threat of 
enforcement   
 
 
Column one describes the events, while columns two and three distinguish court orders 
on the basis of whether Judge Griesa favours the holdout creditors or promotes the 
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restructuring. In the first instance (row one), the creditors who “rush to court” on the 
election of President Kirchner, successfully obtain summary judgements: Judge Griesa 
has no option but to allow such claims [e.g. E.M.LTD v. The Republic of Argentina (12 
Sept. 2003)] (column two). This is only part of the story, however, as successful 
claimants have to enforce their judgements against the debtor by attaching its assets. 
This is where Judge Griesa exercises his discretion, dismissing pleas to attach specific 
assets of the debtor (final column). 
 
In addition in 2003, relatively early on in the debt restructuring process, the creditors 
seek to certify class action suits (row two). Judge Griesa accepts certain claims 
encouraging creditor coordination [H.W.Urban GMBh v. Republic of Argentina (30 
Dec. 2003)] (column two).  However, in his orders rejecting some class action suits, 
[e.g. Alan Applestein TTEE v. The Republic of Argentina (May 12, 2003)], he 
encourages tighter definition of class: he also keeps pari passu pending6 (column three). 
 
In the context of the class action suits, Judge Griesa’s observations (obiter dicta) are 
instructive.  At one point, he observes that 
an important channel for attempting to resolve the Argentine debt problem will 
undoubtedly be the effort to negotiate a debt restructuring plan.’ He continues: ‘judging 
from past national debt crises, these negotiations will be carried on largely, if not entirely 
by debt holders who do not choose to engage in litigation. To the extent that the other debt 
holders whether few or many wish to pursue litigation, the litigation should be well defined 
and its participants should be reasonably identifiable. One reason for this is that those 
involved in the debt restructuring process should have a clear idea of who has chosen 
litigation and thus may not be candidates for participation in a voluntary restructuring plan.  
 
 
In early 2005, just before completion, the vultures attempt to stymie the swap. In the 
first instance, they succeed in their bid to obtain an order to attach the contractual right 
of the debtor to receive old bonds [NML Capital Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina (13 
Mar. 2005)]. In response to Argentina’s submission that this would make it abort the 
swap, Judge Griesa overturns his own judgement. In contrast with precedent, the Judge 
is motivated by a concern to promote restructuring and not only to enforce the claims of 
                                                 
6 With the US administration supporting Argentina’s reading of the clause, see Miller and Thomas (2006, 
Appendix). 
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holdout litigants. Judge Griesa’s decision is affirmed by the Second Circuit who find 
‘[t]hat restructuring is obviously of critical importance to the economic health of the 
nation.’ The findings (in the decisions to vacate the attachment orders) assure the 
creditors who may wish to participate in the swap that the court will ensure its 
successful conclusion. 
 
Chart 1 illustrates this process of Judge-mediated debt-restructuring, with the events 
described above summarised in the upper part of the Chart. Following default by the 
debtor, the court grants summary judgements in favour of holdout creditors as a means 
to prompt the debtor to make an offer. Then, in marked contrast to precedent, Judge 
Griesa reins the holdout creditors in so as to promote a settlement. The Judge is 
concerned with the reasonableness of the swap and the percentage of creditors who 
consent to the amendment. Finally the offer is accepted by a Super Majority Vote 
(SMV) but this leaves a fraction of creditors outside the swap -- and there are no CACs 
to ensure their compliance. (This leads to the next phase, the post-swap outcomes 
analysed in the next section.) 
 
Two particular aspects of this process are worth highlighting. First, that Judge Griesa 
effectively aggregates across creditors in the swap by treating the debt as a consolidated 
whole; second, he keeps the claims of the holdouts distinct from those of creditors 
involved in the ongoing swap. 
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Chart 1 Judge-mediated debt restructuring 
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 4. Judge-mediated debt restructuring: a speculative analysis of post-
swap outcomes  
 
So far, the post-swap phase of Argentine bond litigation has involved unsuccessful 
attempts by professional holdouts to attach the assets of the sovereign and forthright 
denials by the debtor of any compensation for creditors outside the swap. For 
Porzecanski (2005), the latter constitutes the actions of a ‘rogue debtor’ – defined as a 
sovereign who can pick and choose the claims it wishes to satisfy and ignore the rest. 
This pessimistic assessment of the situation is not borne out by low post-swap, 
sovereign spreads paid by the debtor in secondary markets for its existing debt i.e. the 
market does not appear to share Porzecanski’s dire predictions (Sturzenegger and  
Zettelmeyer, 2005c, p.10). Our view of post-swap developments is more nuanced: what 
we observe are judge-mediated efforts to complete the swap in the absence of CACs. 
 
The lower part of Chart 1 indicates future developments, sketching two possible 
outcomes - other than the ‘rogue-debtor’ scenario. First on the far left, the debtor makes 
a late offer of a swap (consistent with the “most-favoured-creditor” commitment made 
to those who accepted the swap). We reckon that this is highly likely to be accepted by 
retail investors since the bonds involved in the swap have increased substantially in 
value. In the interests of their reputation, however, vultures may not be inclined to 
accept a haircut of two thirds; and they have the patience and skill to holdout for years 
trying to prevent Argentina from accessing primary capital markets. But once a late 
offer is accepted by other holdouts, it is doubtful that vultures alone can continue to 
deny a debtor access to primary capital markets (for historical evidence see Esteves, 
2005). 
 
Should Argentina chooses not to make a late offer, it maybe forced to accept direct 
mediation by the courts (as shown in the centre of Chart 1): in an unprecedented 
development, Judge Griesa has indicated the court’s willingness to mediate a settlement 
directly should this prove necessary to complete the swap. Specifically, in one of many 
similar summary judgements [Vanina Andrea EXPOSITO  v. The Republic of Argentina 
(17 Feb. 2006)] he directs that 
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 Judgement will be entered for the principal amount of the bonds plus accrued 
interest. The parties shall consult with one another concerning the form of the judgement 
and the amounts of interest that should be awarded in the judgement. If the parties are 
unable to reach an agreement on those subjects, they shall jointly submit an agreed 
proposed judgement to the court. If the parties are unable to reach agreement on those 
subjects, plaintiff shall submit a proposed judgement to the court, and the Republic shall 
submit any objections to plaintiff’s proposed judgement within five business days 
thereafter. The court will then resolve any remaining disagreements.  
 
As indicated above, the holdouts are a heterogeneous group with vultures and retail 
investors motivated by different incentives. With direct mediation by the courts, 
holdouts now have the option of submitting their claims to the court and possibly 
obtaining what the other participants obtained in the swap: this may be the way for retail 
investors to settle their claims, Porzecanski (2005). Ironically, judicial enforcement –
with its lack of voluntariness – might free Argentina from its ‘most favoured creditor’ 
commitment to those in the swap7: the debtor can be seen to have had no choice but to 
accede to holdout (especially vulture) claims. But these sequences of events will be time 
consuming and uncertain: it may be designed as a threat to persuade the debtor 
voluntarily to make a late offer as discussed above. 
 
 
5.  CACs, courts and creditor committees  
 
We have emphasised the role that courts (prompted by holdout litigation) have played, 
and are still playing, in the orderly resolution of a major sovereign debt crisis. Study of 
the opinions and orders of Judge Griesa’s court suggests three distinct judicial functions 
– encouraging the debtor to make an offer, promoting a successful debt swap and 
finally dealing with holdouts – which together protect creditor rights. But the new 
bonds include CACs, as is now common with new issues of sovereign debt. The future, 
it seems, belongs to CACs. How will this affect the role of holdouts and of the courts?  
 
                                                 
7 The ‘most favoured creditor’ clause (MFC) clause … sought to assure participating creditors that 
holdout would not get a better deal. (Gelpern, 2005, p 5) 
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Promoting the swap and handling holdouts 
 
Given that CACs are designed to reduce the profit opportunities available to holdouts, it 
should make it easier for creditors to organise a swap, with a SMV requirement of 75% 
as the industry standard. As the IMF has warned, however, aggregation will remain a 
problem: the clauses only operate within a single bond issue, Krueger (2002). The judge 
in the Argentine case viewed the debt as a consolidated whole thereby effectively 
aggregating a majority of the creditors (76%) that participated in the swap. Despite the 
requirement for unanimity in the bond contracts, the courts promoted a swap influenced 
by economic, political and financial factors at the time. Similar action may be called for 
in future. With CACs, however, the issue of recalcitrant holdouts should disappear. 
Subject to the necessary majority for a swap, the holdouts will be impelled to accept the 
same terms. They cannot hold out for better.  
 
While CACs and courts may well solve aggregation and resolve the holdout problem, 
this will not necessarily prompt the debtor into making an offer. Vultures may not have 
the incentive to initiate debtor engagement but existing creditors will, as we explain in 
the next section. 
 
Debtor engagement: Class action suits and bondholder organisation 
 
The historical record provides evidence of the effectiveness of formal and permanent 
bondholder committees like the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders in the early 
part of the 20th century (Eichengreen and Portes, 1995; Esteves, 2005). Mauro and 
Yafeh (2003, p.26) point out that, “… one of the roles of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (CFB) [was] to protect small bondholders from large bondholders who 
might otherwise arrange for a separate, advantageous deal for themselves in exchange 
for the promise to provide the country with new lending.”  
 
This is relevant to the Argentine case where many small creditors sold out to 
institutional investors at prices of less than 30 cents.  Esteves (2005) suggests that 
enhanced creditor organisation will substantially increase creditor payoffs: but, because 
institutional investors acted to coordinate creditors and to negotiate with the debtor, the 
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payoff to creditors as a whole would probably not have risen much – as the economic 
analysis of the swap in this paper confirms.  
 
Even without bondholder committees, there is still hope: class action suits. Buchheit 
and Gulati (2002) argue that class action suits could be used to involve courts in 
sovereign debt restructuring. According to them creditors have a basic “class” interest8 
which is distinguishable from the interest of an individual creditor. With CACs 
including SMV this class interest is better defined9. Class action procedures would 
engender the formation of ex-post, ad hoc creditor committees that would prompt the 
debtor into making an offer. In the latest judgement in the existing (and only) certified 
class action, Judge Griesa granted the motion of the class for summary judgement 
[H.W.URBAN GMBH, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. The 
Republic of Argentina (9 March 2006)]. This favourable judgment increases the 
effectiveness of this option in the future. 
 
To conclude, we see the vulture-initiated strategies for debt resolution as important 
principally in the period of transition to CACs. Unlike Fisch and Gentile (2004), who 
emphasise the continuing role of the vultures, we assume that SMV under CACs will 
reduce the threat of holdout litigation as we know it, but will nonetheless leave an 
important role for judicial intervention in debt restructuring.10   
 
Thus instead of the threat of attachment by specialist creditors, it will hopefully be the 
formation of ex ante Creditor Committees, class actions suits and the possibility of 
judge-mediated resolution of disagreements between the debtor and holdouts  that will 
prompt the debtor into making an offer to successfully restructure its debt. 
 
                                                 
8 A class interest is one in which creditors as a class can achieve a settlement more effectively than 
individual creditors. 
9 While Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) may dismiss class action procedures as ineffective for 
solving holdout problem, with CACs this is no longer an issue. 
10 The incentives for vultures to litigate will arise from issues in which they have a SMV. They will use 
the courts to enforce hundred percent claims against the debtor. In the absence of unanimity however, 
these claims will be isolated at the margin and will not affect the entire debt. 
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Conclusions  
 
Our interpretation of the Argentine litigation is that Judge Griesa used creditor 
heterogeneity to promote the swap – encouraging holdouts to bring the debtor to the 
negotiating table but restraining them when they threaten the swap itself. Following this 
interpretation, we believe that the Judge will encourage the holdouts to threaten 
Argentina’s access to primary credit markets unless and until it deals satisfactorily with 
creditors outside the swap. The latter is made possible by his willingness to resolve 
disagreements that may arise between the holdouts and Argentina. If this happens, 
Argentina should regain access to primary credit markets. 
 
Our conclusions differ from those of Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) who are 
inclined to dismiss the role of holdout litigation in favour of reputational models. Our 
interpretation can also be contrasted with the view that holdout litigation represents a 
lasting solution to sovereign debt crises, Fisch and Gentile (2004). We agree with them 
that holdout litigation is ‘part of the solution and not the problem’ (Roubini, 2002), but 
believe that to be true only in the period of transition to CACs. Our description of judge-
mediated debt restructuring emphasises the role of the common law judges in the 
orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises, currently and in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
The size of the write-down and the long delay: a bargaining approach 
It is clear from Table 2 that lenders to emerging markets may be exposed to substantial 
losses and to prolonged delay in restructuring in some cases. In addition, the Argentine 
case challenged the idea that the IMF must play a central role in arranging sovereign 
debt swaps: stymied by conflict of interest and criticised by both debtor and creditors 
for its earlier handling of Argentina’s affairs, the Fund had to withdraw to the sidelines 
and let creditors and the debtor sort things out themselves.11 
 
With the IMF hors de combat, the New York Court had perforce to play a greater role. 
But the court does not carry the same big stick as the Fund: its role is to promote 
negotiations between sovereign and the creditors to achieve a fair outcome, and to 
preserve the sovereign debt market. In this spirit, Dhillon et al. 2006 apply a bargaining 
approach to explain both the final settlement and the delay in achieving it, assuming 
implicitly that the court is holding the ring. The authors follow the approach of Merlo 
and Wilson (1998)  where the size of the pie is uncertain and ‘efficient delay’ can occur 
as creditor and debtor wait for economic recovery - fearing that early settlement will 
lock in the recession. (The Rubinstein model of alternating offers, applied to sovereign 
debt negotiations by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), is not used because it predicts prompt 
settlement.) 
 
Based on the creditor response to the initial Argentine offer at Dubai in 2003 Dhillon et 
al. (2006) estimate that the “pie” to be divided between debtor and creditors was worth 
almost 3% of GDP. Allowing for the “first mover” advantage for the debtor as proposer, 
the bargaining model implies that creditors receive a little under half the pie. On this 
basis, the predicted recovery rate on debt without interest is 41 cents – a little better than 
the final settlement (estimated to be worth about 34 cents in Table 2). 
As for the prolonged delay, the authors note that political factors played a critical role 
until 2003 when President Duhalde – appointed earlier by Congress as interim office-
holder – was replaced by President Kirchner after a general election. Because the 
expected annual rate of economic recovery in 2003 exceeded the time rate of discount12, 
it is claimed that further postponement was economically ‘efficient’. An alternative 
                                                 
11 “Argentina has become a test case for a vastly reduced role for the IMF and the official sector more 
broadly in the sovereign debt restructuring process”, Roubini and Setser (2004a). 
12 Estimated to be 4% for both parties 
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account for delay under President Kirchner is explored by Ghosal and Miller (2006). 
There it is noted that, if the debtor is aware of the constraints impose by sustainability 
while the creditor is not, the former may have an incentive to make a low offer leading 
to delay in order to act as a signal to the creditor (that sustainability is a serious cause 
for concern). On this reasoning, the Argentine government would not have expected  
creditors to accept the offer made at Dubai in 2003; but the final settlement reached in 
2005 - broadly in line with Argentina’s sustainability guidelines - would reflect a 
successful signalling strategy by the President and his finance minister.13  
 
The observed delay and the write down are, it seems, broadly consistent with a 
bargaining approach. Moreover, according to Porzecanski (2005), the fall of the 
currency rendered the government insolvent because of the large debts contracted by 
previous administrations. He notes in his introduction that “[a] sinking currency 
rendered the government instantly insolvent; the net government debt, which at the one 
peso per dollar exchange rate was equivalent to three times tax revenues and 50% of 
GDP, virtually tripled once the currency sank to around three pesos per dollar, 
becoming unaffordable to service”: and he also observes that policy prior to 2002 
involved the authorities then in power “betting the ranch” by borrowing almost 
exclusively in dollars and other foreign currencies to finance a string of budgetary 
deficits, even though their revenues were due and collected only in pesos.14 
(Porzecanski, 2005). 
 
If Argentina was insolvent for reasons to do with previous administrations, why should 
it be treated as a rogue debtor? In our view, it all depends on how creditors outside the 
swap are dealt with. The bargaining model assumes that all creditors get parity of 
treatment (as they might with under CACs). So far, however, those outside the swap 
have received nothing. How the sovereign might deal with the holdouts so as to avoid 
been treated as rogue debtor is discussed in section 4 of the paper. 
 
                                                 
13 Roberto Frankel, an economist who was a close observer of the swap, reckoned that the finance 
minister deserved a bronze statue in the Plaza de Mayo for his negotiating tactics! (Liascovich, 2005, 
p.257 ) 
14 For an interesting analysis of how a government which cannot pre-commit to control spending may 
expose the country to recurrent crises, see Rochet (2005).  
